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·IN THE SUPREME COURT
0F THE STATE OF UTAH
1

BRASHER :MOTOR AND
FINANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.
RICHARD A. BRO,i\TN and J ACQUELINE A. BRO,i\TN, partners dba
B & C COl\lP ANY, a partnership,
Defendants-Appellants.

I

11,601

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\lENT OF THE CASE

1

Plaintiff filed suit for replevin of certain motor
vehicles held by defendants on trust receipts; defendants filed a counterclaim, the exact nature and grounds
of which was never quite clear to the plaintiff.
I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Court on its own motion dismissed the complaint
and counterclaim for failure of both parties to prose. ·
cute the action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks to have the order of the .
court affirmed.
·
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set forth by the defendants.'
appellant.s as relates to the sequence of filings of pleadings and motions in this matter are essentially correct, 1
except that the file and record before this Court does
not contain the Notice of Readiness for Trial allegedly
filed by the defendants.
The Sheriff's Return on the Writ of Replevin
made July 25, 1963 showed that he was unable to locate
any of the property sought by the Writ (R. 6). Hence,•
for all practical purposes plaintiff then lost interest in
its Complaint. Almost one month later, on August 21,
1963, defendants filed their counterclaim (R. 9-10).
Plaintiff immediately, on August 29, 1963, filed a Mo·
tion to Strike the Counterclaim (R. 20) and there the
matter stood dormant until January 13, 1969 when :
defendants served on plaintiff a Notice of Readiness
for Trial, although the record fails to disclose tha't such
1

1

2

Notice was actually filed with the Court. Plaintiff immediately, on January 20, 1969, filed its Objections
to such Notice of Readiness (R. 22). Defendants did
not even then move to call up such objections or the
previous Motions of plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed an
Amended Motion to Strike the Counterclaim ( R. 2530) and called the same up for hearing on March 14,
1969. (R. 27). It was at that hearing that the Court
on its own Motion dismissed the Complaint and the
Counterclaim. Hence, the statement of defendantsappellants in their Statement of Facts that each party
was proceeding at the time of dismissal to a determinal!on of the issues of the merits is not true, inasmuch as
the case, and particularly the Counterclaim, was never
at issue and the defendants were donig nothing to get
it at issue.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAS PO,VER ON
ITS O'\TN MOTION TO DISMISS BOTH COMPLAINTS AND COUNTERCLAil\IS F 0 R
LACK OF PROSECUTION.
POINT II
THERE IS NO NEED FOR A PARTY TO
SHO,i\T PREJUDICE ON HIS PART BEFORE

3

HE MAY MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL FOR
WANT OF PROSECUTION.
POINT III
A DECISION OF A LOWER COURT DISMISSING AN ACTION, FOR WANT OF DUE

DILIGENCE IN PROSECUTION, MAY NOT
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL UNLESS
THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY THE COURT.
POINT IV
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
COUNTERCLAIM, THE LOWER COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAS POWER ON '.
ITS OWN MOTION TO DISMISS BOTH COM·
PLAINTS AND COUNTERCLAIMS F 0 R
LACK OF PROSECUTION.
Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure '
deals with involuntary dismissals and provides in per·
tinent part that:
4

"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
comply with these rules or any order of court,
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or any claim against him .... Unless the court
in its order for dismisal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdiYisio11 and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for a lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensible
party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits."
Rule 41 ( c) then goes on to provide : "The provisions
of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third party claim." Quite clearly, those
rules permit a defendant to move for dismissal of a
plaintiff's complaint for lack of prosecution and permit
a plaintiff to move for dismissal of a defendant's counterclaim for the same reason. However, in the light of the
above-stated rule, may a court dismiss a complaint or
counterclaim of its own motion? The answer is clearly

yes.

It is generally held that courts inherently have
the power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution.
This power is in addition to the expressed statutory
procedure for dismissal. The general rule is stated in
27 C.J.S. Dismissal & Nonsuit §65 at 233 as follows:

"While statutes or rules of court providing
for the dismissal of actions for want of prosecution have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions, such statutes or rules must be read in the
light of the existence of such inherent power,
which remains unimpaired unless it is limited

5

expressly or by necessary implication. Thus it
has been held that the affirmative expression of
the statutes providing for dismissal does not
deprive the court of its inherent powers."
This proposition is amply supported by case law. For
example, the Supreme Court of Idaho in interpreting
Rule 41 ( b) of their Rules of Civil Procedure, which
is almost word for word the same as our Rule 41 (b),
said:
"A trial court has the power to dismiss a case
because of failure to prosecute with due diJi.
gence; such power is inherent and independent
of any statute or rule of court.... Rule 41 (b)
'did not take away or limit this power but recog- .'
nized and incorporated it in a code of civil procedure.' " Beckman v. Beckman, 88 Idaho 522,
401 P.2d 810, 812 ( 1965).

In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Nevada in .
Harris v. Harris, 65 Nev. 342, 196 P.2d 402 ( 1948),
discussed the inherent power of the court to dismiss
for want of prosecution in affirming a lower court's
dismissal of a cross-complaint. The court said:
1

"Likewise, a court of record has inherent ,
power to dismiss a cross-complaint for lack of
diligence in its prosecution. [Citing cases.)
1

This inherent discretionary power which a
court of record possessed remains unimpaired
unless it is expressly limited by statute." 196
P.2d at 404.

6

1

The Supreme Court of Oregon has clearly stated the
rule in Horn v. California-Oregon Power Co., 221 Ore.
328,351P.2d80 (1960), as follows:
"Yirtually all courts rule that they have inherent power to dismiss cases if failure to prosecute with due diligence is established." 351 P.2d
at 83.

g
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It is also clear that as part of this inherent power
to dismiss every court has, in the absence of direct
regulation by statute, the power to dismiss an action
of it own motion without the necessity of either party
moving for dismissal. .For example, in City of Wichita
t'. Katino, 175 Kan. 657, 265 P.2d 849 (1954), a defendant in a criminal prosecution appealed from a
police court to the district court. The district court
<lismissed on its own motion for lack of prosecution.
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court affirmed. In so doing, the court recognized the general rule that: "The power of a court to
dismiss a case, upon its own motion, because of failure
to prosecute with due diligence is inherent and exists
independently of any statute." 265 P.2d at 850. Similarly, the Supureme Court of Wyoming has held in

· Moshannon Nat'l. Bank v. Iron Mountain Ranch Co.,
"Tyo. 265, 18 P.2d 623, rehearing denied, 21 P.2d
a
(1933), that courts have the inherent power to
dismiss of their own motion for want of prosecution.
)6
The Supreme Court of Oregon has also so held in
Reed v. First N at'l Bank of Gardner, 194 Ore. 45, 241
P.2d 109 ( 1952). In affirming a lower court's dismissal

7

for want of prosecution, the court characterized the
two ways of proceeding to dismiss as follows:
"In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the court may proceed under the statute
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that
end. In acting on its own motion, the court must
proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest
in the records that the court's discretion has
been abused." 241 P.2d at 115.
A recent Arizona decision has also recognized thi5
power. In Cooper v. Odom, 6 Ariz. App. 466, 433 P.2d
646 ( 1967) , the Arizona court made the following :
comment in affirming the lower court's exercise of discretion in dismissing an action for want of prosecution:

"Trial courts have the inherent power to dismiss a case on their own motion if the case has ·
not been diligently prosecuted. [Citing cases.]
In this respect the exercise by the trial court will
not be
appeal in the absence of an
abuse of discretion. 433 P.2d at 646.
·
1

1

The Supreme Court of New Mexico has also recognized
the inherent power in the court in the decision of Balar
v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d 195 (1964). The trial
court had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on its own :
motion, and the plaintiff appealed. In upholding the
trial court's decision in dismissing the action, the Supreme Court said:
1

"'Ve have many times held that the district
court has inherent power to dismiss a case for
failure to prosecute, independent of statute, and

8

unless there has been an abuse of discretion, the
trial court's dismissal will not be disturbed on
appeal."

,

1

'

•I

Not only are state court cases unanimous in their
recognition of the inherent power of a court to dismiss
of its own motion for want of prosecution, but federal
cases interpreting Rule 41 ( b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure have also consistently held that that
rule in no way impairs the inherent power of the court.
These federal cases take on some added importance
when it is recognized that the Utah rules are patterned
after the federal rules and Utah has recognized the
persuasiveness of federal precedent in interpreting
those rules. In W ynerger v. Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah
487, 252 P .2d 205 ( 1953) , the court said with respect
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"Since these rules were fashioned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper
that we examine decisions under the Federal
Rules to determine the meanings thereof."

:d ' In reviewing the federal decisions, it has been observed
· in 5 Moore's Federal Practice, ,41.11[2} at 1115:

al

I

rn i
be

"Rule 41 (b) clearly places dismissal for failure to prosecute in the district court's discretion.

u·

'Vhile Rule 41 (b) provides that 'a defendant
may move' for dismissal for want of purosecution, a district court may-either under Rule
83 or the exercise of its inherent power to keep
its docket clear-disµiiss of its own motion for
want of prosecution...."

ict
or
nd

1

9

Perhaps the leading federal case in this area, and the
one that encompasses the principles of the federal rule
is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 8 L.Ed.
2d 734 ( 1962) , in which the Supreme Court held that
a district court had the inherent power to dismiss on
its own motion an action for want of diligent prosecution. The court there stated:
"The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice because
of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be
doubted. The power to invoke this sanction is
necessary in order to prevent undue delays in
the disposition of pending cases and to avoid
congestion in the calendars of the District Courts.
The power is of ancient origin, having its roots
in judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur
entered at common law, e.g., 3 Blackstone, Corn·
mentaries ( 1768), 295-296, and dismissals for
want of prosecution of bills in equity, e.g., id.,
at 451. It has been expressly recognized in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41 (b) ... "

.
,
'
:
.
·

"Petitioner contends that the language of this '
Rule, by negative implication, prohibits involun·
tary dismissals for failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute except upon motion by the defendant. ·
In the present case there was no such motion."
"We do not read Rule 41 (b) as implying any
such restriction. Neither the permissive Ian·
guage of the Rule-which merely authorized a
motion by the defendant-nor its policy requires ,·
us to conclude that it was the purpose of the Rule ·
to abrogate the power of courts, acting on their
own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases

10

that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief. The authority of a court to dismiss sua
sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been
considered an 'inherent power', governed not
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so
as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."

*

*

*

"Accordingly, when circumstances make such
action appropriate, a District Court may dismiss
a complaint for failure to prosecute even without
affording notice of its intention to do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting."
In contrast to the vast source of precedent touched
on above, appellants claim that the district court has
no power either by statute or inherently to dismiss both
the complaint and counterclaim of its own motion for
, want of prosecution and cite in support thereof a rule
of civil procedure which has no application to this
situation and a Utah Supreme Court decision which
is totally irrelevant. Appellants cite and use extensively Rule 41 (a) which involves voluntary dismissal
of actions and Watson v. White, .... Utah .... , .... P.2d
.... ,June 18, 1969, which interprets that rule.

Rule 41 (a) provides that a plaintiff may not
t'olnntarily move to have his own action dismissed unless a counterclaim filed by the defendant may stand
, independently. Quite obviously, the purpose of the rule
is to prevent a plaintiff from dismissing and putting
out of court a defendant, who may have a perfectly

11

valid cause of action on a counterclaim, by voluntarily
dismissing his own action. That rule clearly has 0;1
application to a dismissal for want of diligence in prosecuting an action. In this case plaintiff made no motion
to voluntarily dismi.ss his action. The dismissal resulted
from action taken by the court, of its own motion, to
dismiss both the plaintiff's complaint and the counter.
claim for want of due diligence in prosecution. All the
plaintiff did was fail to object to the court's dismissal
of its complaint and joined with the court in its motion
to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim for want of
prosecution. With this background, the decision of
Watson v. White becomes quite irrelevant. In that .
decision, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the entire action, '
both his complaint and the counterclaim. The motion
to dismiss the complaint was based upon Rule 41 (a) 1
and the motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim
was based upon laches, the plaintiff claiming that the
defendant was barred as a matter of law from prosecut.
ing his counterclaim because of his laches in failing ·
to file said counterclaim until almost six years after the :
filing of the complaint. The court ruled that plaintiff's .
motion to dismiss the counterclaim was not timely.
Initially the court noted that under Rule 41 (a) , once '
defendant's counterclaim is filed plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss his claim unless the counterclaim may
stand independently of the complaint. Since this Court
did not reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing ·
the complaint, the court must have found that the ·
counterclaim could exist independently of the com·

12

plaint .The court then went on to correctly point out
that the only way a counterclaim could be dismissed
under a Rule 41 (a) voluntary dismissal motion was
by agreement of the defendant. With reference to the
question of defendant's !aches, the court held that the
trial court was without discretion to rule upon that
issue until the propriety of a voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41 (a) was determined. That decision clearly has
no application to a dismissal by the court of the defendant's counterclaim for want of prosecution under
Rules 41 (b) and (c) and through the court's inherent
power. This motion to dismiss in the White case could
not possibly have been construed as a Rule 41 (b) motion since it was made almost immediately after the
defendant's counterclaim had been filed. The holding
in that case is totally inapplicable to any question involved in this appeal.

POINT II
THERE IS NO NEED FOR A PARTY TO
SHOW PREJUDICE ON HIS PART BEFORE
HE MAY MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL FOR
WANT OF PROSECUTION.
Although some cases have appeared in talk in
terms of the necessity of showing prejudice or injury
before a party may move for a nonsuit or dismissal,
it is generally held that such injury or prejudice may
be presumed by the court from a long delay. The general rule has been stated as follows:

13

"While it has been held that the defendant in
order to be entitled to a nonsuit or a dismissal
must
as well as la.ck of due diligence
on plamhff s part, the law will presume injurl'
from the unreasonable delay." 27 C.J .S. Dismis·.
sal & Nonsuit §65 ( 2) at 440.
In affirming a lower court's decision dismissing au
action for want of prosecution, the Supreme Court of
Montana in interpreting Rule 41 (b) of their Rules
of Civil Procedure, a rule which is patterned after the
Federal rule and very similar to the Utah rule, said
with reference to the question of prejudice:
"Plaintiff argues that the action could not be ,
dismissed as defendant has shown no injury by
the delay. When a plaintiff has slept on his cause
for over 12 years the law presumes injury and .
places the burden on the plaintiff to show good i
cause for the delay." Creemer v. Braaten, 438
P.2d 553, 554 (Mont. 1968).
1

;

!

California also has recognized this general rule when \
in the decision of Welden v. Davis Auto Exchange, 315 i
P .2d 33 (Cal. 1957), the court said:
I

"Appellant contends the trial judge ought not ·
to have granted the motion for there was no I
affirmative showing that respondent was preju· ,
diced by the delay. In Gray v. T!Jnes-Mirror
Co., 11 Cal. App. 155, at pages 163-164,
P. 281, at page 484 we find: 'We do not under·
stand it to be necessary for the party moving to,!
dismiss for want of diligence in prosecuting an
action to affirmatively show the extent of the
inconvenience or injury he has suffered, or may ·
1

14

suffer by reason of the delay. The law will presume injury from unreasonable delay.' " 315
P.2d at 36-37.

I·
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On the other hand, it is quite clear that in exercising its discretion, the trial court may consider the
existence of prejudice in deciding whether or not to
dismiss. An understanding of this principle explains
the decisions cited by the appellants in their brief
which on the surface appear to hold that showing of
prejudice is necessary. In the decision of Wright v.
Howe, 46 Utah 488, 150 P. 956 (1915), a decision
rendered some 20 years prior to the adoption of our
present rules of procedure, the Utah Supreme Court
upheld a lower court's refusal to dismiss for lack of
diligence. In so doing, the court observed that the
defendant in making his motion to dismiss had failed
to show that he had been prejudiced in any way by
the delay. Likewise, in Lyon v. State, 76 Idaho 37 4,
283 P.2d 1105, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld
a lower court's decision refusing to dismiss for want
of due diligence when the defendant had failed to show
any prejudice. Neither court affirmatively held that
a showing of prejudice is a prerequisite to dismissal.
All these cases in fact held is that the lower court did
not abuse their discretion in failing to dismiss where
no prejudice was demonstrated. It is suggested that the
appellate court in each case was merely permitting the
tr!al court to consider prejudice as one of the factors
upon which it could base its decision.

:I

1ay •
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This has been suggested in 2B Barron and Holt.
zoff's Federal Practice and Procedure, §918 at 143-144.

"It has been said on the one hand that dis-

missal will not be ordered unless there has been
prejudice to the defendant, and on the other
hand, that if the delay is unreasonable, prejudice will be presumed. Probably the sound
answer is that the defendant need not show
prejudice, but that the court will consider tlk
prejudice, if any, to the defendant, in determining whether to excuse plaintiff's failure."
That statement is amply supported by citation of fed·
eral cases in the footnotes. State courts have also come
to this same conclusion in interpreting their state rules
of procedure. For example, the Supreme Court of
Alaska in Silverton v. Marler, 389 P.2d 3 (1964), said
in upholding the lower court's dismissal of an action
for want of diligence:
"The court below had sufficient reason to dis·
miss the action for failure to prosecute. It was
not necessary, as appellant contends, for ap·
pellees to show prejudice by reason of delay in
service before dismissal would be justified. The
operative condition of Civil Rule 41 (b) is lack
of reasonable diligence on the part of the appel·
lant and not a showing by appellees that they
would be prejudiced if the action were not dis·
missed. Prejudice or lack of it is a factor
may be considered by the court in the case o!
moderate excusable neglect. But here the neg·
lect on the appellant's part was neither moderate
nor excusable." 389 P.2d at 6.

16

The Supreme Court of Oregon has also quite clearly
pointed out that prejudice is a factor to be considered,
though it is not a necessary prerequisite to a dismissal
for lack of prosecution. In Horn v. California-Oregon
Power Co., supra, the court made the following obserration in discussing the factors going into showing a
lack of due diligence:
"Justice should be administered with reasonable promptness and any action upon the part
of the suitor which is at variance with that objective must be given consideration whether the
procrastination is of long duration or short. The
issue of diligence generally cannot be determined
by doing nothing more than counting the days
that have passed. Illness, the absence of a witness, prejudice to the defendant, the impending
decision of a similar case in another court and
other similar factors must generally be considered in addition to the length of delay in
resolving the issues of due diligence." 351 P.2d
at 84.
; !
1

1 '.
•I

1.

f

However, the court went on to indicate quite clearly
that prejudice is not a necessary prerequisite to the
finding of lack of due diligence :
"Even though the defendants did not accompany their motion which sought dismissal with a
showing of prejudice, such a showing was not
essential." 351 P.2d at 84.

I

The court then pointed out that when the delay is
e of an excesively long period of time, the court may
presume that injury has occurred and the burden of

·• !
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showing justification for the delay is then placed upon
the claimant.
"["\V]hen the plaintiff came to the hearing of
March 4, 1958, she knew that she was confronted
with the duty of explaining her long delay. She
also knew that the court would presume that
her dilatory course had injured the defendant."
351 P.2d at 84.

POINT III

A DECISION OF A LOWER COURT DIS-.I
MISSING AN ACTION, FOR WANT OF DUE
DILIGENCE IN PROSECUTION, MAY NOT I
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL UNLESS 1
THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY THE COURT.
1

I

In some strange way, the appellant
to intimate
that the district court has no discretion in dismissing
a complaint or counterclaim for want or lack of prose- '1
cution. However, there is nothing either in the cnse:
law or in the rule
which would support such a i
conclusion. Rule 41 (b) which deals with dismissal ol i
actions for want of prosecution does not spell out the
grounds upon which such a dismissal may be made or ,
,
I
the factors to be taken into consideration by the court.
Quite obviously, the rule leaves the dismissal within,
the court's discretion to be determined upon the facts
and circumstances involved in each case. If the courts I
did no't have discretion, they would be effectively pre·
eluded from ever dismissing an action for want of '·
I

1'

1

1

J
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1

1
1

prosecution under the present structure of Rule 41 (b)
since there is no definition of the phrase "failure to
prosecute." Appellant apparently bases his claim that
the court lacks discretion upon his misunderstanding
of Rule 41 (a). It is true that with reference to a volimtary dismissal, the court does not have discretion
to grant the voluntary motion of the plaintiff to dismiss the entire action if a counterclaim has been filed
and the counterclaim may not exist independently of
the complaint. However, as noted above, this rule has
no application whatsoever to the present situation.
The cases cited above under Point I clearly demonstrate that the courts have recognized that a dismissal
for lack of prosecution is within the discretion of the
trial court. Those cases also indicate that once that
discretion has been exercised by the trial court, the
decision may not be overturned on appeal unless a clear
abuse of discretion may be demonstrated. A few additional citations might be helpful in further tying down
this principle. In Creemer v. Braaten, supra, the Supreme Court of Montana phrased it this way:
"It is within the discretion of the trial court
to dismiss an action if it has not been prosecuted
with reasonable diligence. It is presumed that
the trial court acted correctly and its decision
will not be overturned without a showing of
an abuse of discretion." 438 P.2d at 554.

1

The Supreme Court of Idaho in interpreting their Rule
H(b) in the decision of Beckman v. Beckman, supra,
stated the rule as follows:
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"The trial court's order or judgment dismiss.
ing an action for lack of prosecution will be re.
versed only for an abuse of discretion. (Citing
cases.} 'Ve are constrained to view that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion." 401 P.2d at
812.

In Horn v. California-Oregon Power Co., supra, the

court required the following kind of demonstration of
abuse of discretion before it would overturn the lower .
court's decision:

"['V}hen a case has been long neglected and I
no adequate excuse is offered for the neglect, '.
an inference arises that the case lacks merit. i
Under those circumstances an affidavit or some- :.
thing of a similar nature should be offered sho1\'ing that the case actually possesses merit. Noth. ·
ing of that kind is on file in the case. A party :
whose case is dismissed in the circuit [trial] court '
for lack of prosecution and who asks an appellate I
court to reverse the circuit court's order should
see to it that the record contains something sub-;
stantial which will justify the appellate court's I
!
reversing." 351 P.2d at 85.
1

I

The federal case law has been summarized in 5 Moore's'.
Federal Practice, ,41.11 [2} at 1125, as follows:
I
i

"Since the order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute is discretionary, it will not be
,
on appeal unless there has been an abuse of dis- i
cretion."
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POINT IV
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
COUNTERCLAIM, THE LOWER COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.
There is ample evidence contained in the record
on appeal that the defendants-appellants are truly
guilty of a failure to prosecute and nothing to indicate
otherwise. Initially, it is clear that the burden of proceeding forward with the case is upon the claimant.
Under normal circumstances, the adverse party has no
affirmative duty to move the case forward but needs
only to defend against the claim and take whatever
steps are necessary in effecting that defense. The Supreme Court of Colorado in interpreting their Rule
4I(b) in Koon v. Bar'mettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d
713 ( 1956) , stated the rule as follows:
"The burden rests upon plaintiff and not upon
defendant, to prosecute a case in due course and
without unusual delay."
That this is also true with reference to the prosecution
of a counterclaim is demonstrated by the
of
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Pettine v. Rogers, 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638 (1958). The plaintiff
moved to have defendant's counterclaim dismissed under
Rule 41 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure
for want of prosecution. In affirming the trial court's
dismissal, the Supreme Court said:
"The duty rests upon the claimant in every
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stage of the proceeding to use diligence to e.
pedite his case." 321 P.2d at 640.
x

It should be obvious from the record in this actiun
that the defendant has not carried its burden in pro.
ceeding forward with the case. The record on appeal
which is the certified file of the district court indicates
that the Notice of Readiness of Trial prepared by thr
defendant which brought this action to a head was in
fact never filed. As a result, no official action was taken
by the defendant on his counterclaim for approximately
51/2
As it turns out, the only action taken
;,
that period of time was taken by the planitiff. Defendant's delay has been excessive; it is suggesetd that under,
the cases cited above, the delay is of a long enougn '
duration to enable the court to assume prejudice on
the part of the plaintiff. In addition, the defendant:
has been in a position during this entire period to!
serve process on and bring into the action the other i
parties which defendant alleged were in conspiriM:y :
with Brasher .Motor Company and as a result shoula i
be parties to the action. However, no such action wa1 !
taken. The case are quite clear that a failure to serve [
a party which should be and is a part of the action when·
that party has been available for service clearly demon·'
strates a lack of due diligence. See, e.g., Beenally r
Pigman, 78 N.M. 189, 429 P.2d 648 (1967); Silverto11
v. Marler, 389 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1964).
I

Defendants have attempted to show justificatio1, 1
by claiming that the action was, at the time of the dis·
missal, being actively prosecuted. They argue that:
1
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1

regardless of the prior delays, now that the action is
being prosecuted it may not be dismissed. The whole
basis of defendants' counterclaim relates to matters
which defendants allege plaintiff did in concert with
others whom defendants' counterclaim states would
later be joined as third-party defendants. Nothing was
done by defendants under Rule 14 (a) or otherwise to
join such third parties and the statutes of limitations
obviously would bar any such actions against such proposed third parties at this late date. How can defendants
therefore claim that they either diligently, seriously,
or at all pursued their counterclaim? The record is
absolutely void of any evidence that the defendants
' were actively prosecuting their counterclaim. The
only basis upon which they may make such a claim
is the preparation of a Notice of Readiness for Trial.
! However, even if defendants had or did file such a
notice, it alone would not be sufficient to show an active
prosecution of the case. The Supreme Court of Oregon
I in Horn v. California-Oregon Power Co., supra, indicated that a mere filing of a Motion for Continuance
was not sufficient to show an active prosecution of the
case. The court said:

1

II

ill

,.,

,I

"The mere fact that a plaintiff who is accused
of inexcusable delay files a motion for a continuance-such as the plaintiff in the case at bar
filed-cannot be viewed as an automatic release
from the predicament created by the delay for
if the plaintiff could escape that easily from the
exigency into which his slothful ways cast him,
0.R.S. 18.260 and the inherent power of the
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court to dismiss inactive cases would be stripp rl
of their potency." 351 P.2d at 85.
e
It would appear that much of the language of the .
Oregon court could be applicable to the filing of a
Notice of Readiness for Trial. A filing of such a
motion does certainly not, in and of itself, indicate that
the party so filing has been actively prosecuting the
case. This is especially true with reference to
action where it is obvious that even if such a notice ·
had been filed, the defendant was not prepared to•
proceed on his counterclaim, since he had never in-:
eluded as parties to the action those he claimed were :
in conspiracy with Brasher Motor and Finance Com- i
pany, and furthermore, the case was not even at issue, '
since plaintiff's Motion to strike the counterclaim fileu
51/2 years before, had never been called up by defend· ·
ants or disposed of in any way. In addition, even a!
cursory reading of the counterclaim demonstrates that I
I
substantial discovery work would be necessary to proye :
the allegations contained therein. No discovery work
of the nature required by the counterclaim has been
performed. In filing the Notice of Readiness, defend·
ants-appellants had to know that the representatiom
therein were not true because the state of the recora;
showed plainly that the case was not at issue. The i
filing of the Notice of Readiness for Trial appears to
have been merely a stalling tactic in hopes of putting i
pressure on the plaintiff to make some kind of offer 1
of settlement. The California courts have recognizea i
that an attempt to get a trial date was not sufficient
1

1
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to demonstrate that the plaintiff in

fact had been
actively prosecuting the case. In Atkinson v. County
of Los .Angeles, 180 Cal. App. 2d 467, 4 Cal. Rptr. 423
(l960), the lower court
an action for want
of prosecution. In affirming that decision, the court
said:

"The sole issue on this appeal is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
'the action. The discretion was that of the trial
court and the exercise thereof will not be disturbed except in cases of manifest abuse. [Citing
cases. J The trial court was bound to consider
whether the plaintiff had had a reasonable opportunity to bring the action to trial and had discharged the duty imposed upon every person
who filed an action to prosecute it with reasonable promptness and diligence. [Citing cases.]
The fact that the motion for dismissal was made
after a date for trial had been set pursuant to
the request filed on September 5, 1957, did not
in and of itself preclude the granting of the
motion." 4 Cal. Rptr. at 426.

It is obvious that something more than a mere filing

of a Notice of Readiness for Trial must be done to

demonstrate that the defendants were actively prosecuting their claim.

As an excuse for the lack of diligence in prosecut-

ing his claim and apparently as a justification for a

finding of abuse of discretion upon the part of the
lower court, the defendants claim that the delay was
due in part to the fault of the plaintiff, and in so doing
cite the decision of Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Rob-
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bins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624. The defendants t
claim that that case stands for the proposition that &
whenever either party may bring the action to trial or s
to a conclusion, a granting of a motion to dismiss for 11
lack of prosecution is improper. However, if such were s
the holding of that case, it would totally abrogate the si
operation of Rule 41 ( b), and no motion to dismiss for . F
lack of prosecution could ever be granted, since botn , o
parties to an action are always free to file a Notice · m
of Readiness for Trial, or to call up pending motiom. ei
A close reading of the Crystal Lime & Cement Co. case
clearly demonstrates that the holding of the court ii
not nearly so broad, and is predicated entirely upon tc
the factual situation in that case. In that case, the plain ' 11'
tiff's complaint and the def endanfs counter-claim haa 01
been fully tried. The court had rendered a decision : er
in part for the plaintiff on his complaint and also in i p:
part for the defendant on his counterclaim. However, ' p:
neither party filed findings of fact and conclusions ol ! bi
law and no judgment of the court was ever entered. fe
Some 8 years later, the lower court granted defend· w
ant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The tl
Supreme Court reversed holding that since both the! w
defendant and plaintiff had received partial judgment. ti
either could have brought the case to conclusion
· II'
by submitting the proper findings of fact and conclu-'.
sions of law. As a result, this court said a motion to l b
dismiss made by either party was improper since botn ,· ti
\
parties were equally at fault in failing to bring the! tl
matter to a conclusion. This decision is clearly di1· i d
1

1

•
1
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tinguishable from the instant case. In the Crystal Lirne
&Cement case both parties equally shared the responr sibility to file the proper papers with the court. It was
r uot 11 case of equal opportunity, but of equal respont sibility. In the present action, plaintiff has no responsibility to prosecute the defendants' case for them.
r Furthermore, in the Crystal case, there was no question
1 , of prejudice by reason of testimony or evidence become • ing stale or unavailable, because the testimony and
· evidence had all theretofore been presented.

1

The plaintiff herein readily admits that it has
totally abandoned its complaint and has no intention
111
. ': whatsoever of pressing that action. The Sheriff's Return
l on the l\Trit of Replevin showed that none of the propn erty sought by plaintiff could be found ( R. 6) . The
1
n · plaintiff made no objection to the court's dismissal with
• Ii prejudice
of its complaint. In effect, the plaintiff
became a defendant in the action initiated by the de1. fendants in their counterclaim. The burden therefore
[. was no longer upon the plaintiff to move forward with
the case but was upon the defendants to move forward
1
• with the case with their counterclaim. We submit that
11
t. I the holding in the Crystal Lirne & Cement case is in no
r· way pertinent to the matter here before the court.

..
1

•

,;

1

J·

No fault upon the part of the plaintiff can be shown

\ by the record. There is no evidence of settlement nego-

it

\ liations which might justify the long delay. Nor is
i there any evidence that the plaintiff instigated the
! delay by motions to the court for continuances or by
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r
Ii
;

the failure of plaintiff's counsel to appear in court nor
otherwise. The record does not disclose evidence that
the plaintiff has acquiesced in the defendants' delav ,
or has given them permission either by agreement o.r
stipulation of counsel to delay the proceedings. As a1'
result, the defendants have totally failed to show anv
justification for their failure to actively and diligent];. I
prosecute their counterclaim and to bring it to a con. ,
clusion. As a result of this and the failure to show anv
abuse of di.scretion on the lower court's part
face of the extended length of time which this action
has lain dormant, the relief sought by defendants on
appeal should be denied.

l

CONCLUSION
'Ve respectfully submit that the trial court haa
the power on its own motion to dismiss both the com·
plaint and the counterclaim for lack of prosecution;\
that no abuse of discretion has been or could be shown
on the part of the court; and, that the judgment ol
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PUGSLEY, HAYES, 'VATKISS,
CAMPBELL & COWLEY
ZARE. HAYES
GLEN E. DAVIES
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent

28

